ological individualism," which I take to be the notion that any empirically valid theory of society must be founded on an understanding of the choices of individuals, without any reification of collectivities.'6 In particular, James Buchanan is first and foremost a methodological individualist, in the sense of that term described immediately above, not a rational choice modeler. Moreover, in contrast to many contemporary economists of a more mathematical persuasion, Buchanan is careful to talk about economics as the study of exchange, not as the science of optimization.17
In fact, in many ways, the five founding classics of Public Choice have relatively little in common with one another! It is largely only thanks to the syncretic perspectives of Gordon Tullock, as expressed in the editorial choices about what to include in the early issues of the journal Papers on Non-Market Decision-Making (soon to be renamed Public Choice), and then the proselytizing on behalf of Public Choice within political science of a remarkably eclectic William Riker, that we see the ideas in these five works as indissolubly linked and part of a broader canvas. For example, James Buchanan, from the beginning, distinguished Public Choice (especially that portion of it that later became known as constitutional political economy) from social choice, and did not attach great importance to Arrow's and related work, since in his view, societies were not like individuals and thus it was not particularly troubling that they did not behave as such.
Three other common mistakes about Public Choice made by many of its critics are to reduce it to a caricature (i.e., purely selfish behavior involving short-run optimization of some one-factor utility function under assumptions of complete information), or to make a prioristic claims that Public Choice approaches cannot account for some particular topic allegedly accountable for only "by incorporating "non-rational" considerations,'8 or to attack Public Choice on the basic of claims that the predictions of its classic works are not born out by evidence. While the books I have identified above are classics, they are not classics in the way that some political theorists view classics, i.e., books in which the answers to the great questions are to be found. Rather these works are trampolines, jumping off points for further work, that allow us to get a lift (a head start) on some important issues. In my view, by and large these books are more important for (a) the style of their approach, (b) the new ideas they introduce, and (c) the importance of the questions they pose, than for any specific empirical predictions.19 Also, works such as Arrow, and Buchanan and Tullock, and even large portions of, say, Downs, Black, and Olson, are best viewed as contributions to normative political philosophyas such, in my view, they among the best such normative work being done by anyone, especially with respect to issues of representation and democratic theory.
There is one last amusing point to which I would call attention: Despite very high levels of resistance to rational choice work -some but not all of which resistance is associated with an anti-science, anti-quantification bias, and some with professional jealousies -just as Thomas Jefferson said, "We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists" -now virtually all of empirical political science is inextricably tainted with rational choice ideas. Political scientists are all almost now "soft" rational choice theorists in the sense of sharing the simple notion that people (often) do things for reasons and that it's important to try to figure out what those reasons are, and to understand how we may affect the choices people make by affecting the environment (e.g., the institutional structure) within which those choices are made 20 2. Five usefully wrong predictions of public choice scholars It would, on the fact of it, appear quite bothersome that what are commonly taken as some of the most important empirical implications of classic work by Public Choice scholars just don't fit the evidence -a point acknowledged by Bill Niskanen (Niskanen, 1998) and others within the Public Choice community. Here let me focus on five important empirical claims usually attributed to Public Choice theory which have been topics of my own modeling efforts.
1. Majority rule cycles should be omnipresent 2. In two-party competition, political parties should converge. 3. Potential voters shouldn't vote. 4. Potential voters should remain largely ignorant about the choices facing them. 5. Coalitions should be minimal winning.
We will briefly discuss each of these claims, first identifying what are usually taken to be the sources of the claim, then considering the empirical evidence for the inaccuracy of the prediction, then showing why, when we develop a more complex model or a more nuanced approach, the seeming empirical failure largely or entirely goes away. Because of space constraints, my discussion of each of these points will necessarily be somewhat elliptic; the reader is referred to the articles cited for further elaboration of the argumentation. However, the general thread is a simple one: there is no such as the rational choice model of any phenomenon, only a rational choice model (Wuffle, 1999) . Moreover, even when rational choice models appear wrong, they are "usefully wrong." I refer to models that generate empirical conundrums as "usefully wrong" when those models help us to think more clearly about how we need to modify our theories (or rethink our stylized facts) in order to make sense of the world. In my view, as we will see, the models that generated each of the five predictions listed above readily qualify as models that are "usefully wrong." That a model offered in one of the great books (or seminal articles) of Public Choice fails to predict well does not mean that we scrap the intuitions and insights that generated that model. Rather we should try to build on what has been done by other scholars.
Indeed, until certain issues were studied by Public Choice scholars it wasn't clear what were the right questions to ask or the right puzzles to solve. Phenomena that we now see as highly problematic, e.g., voters bothering to vote, coalitions that are more than minimal winning, stability instead of cycles, long went unrecognized. Moreover, whatever may be the failings of existing Public Choice models (or of rational choice models, more generally), you can't beat something with nothing. Thus, for any phenomenon that is being studied, one must compare the available model(s) with whatever alternatives scholars with other perspectives might be offering. If all somebody does is criticize existing work by Public Choice scholars without showing any ability to do better at making sense of the world, then, valuable as that criticism may be, the scholar should at least have the common courtesy to recognize just how difficult the problem being addressed really is.
Majority rule cycles should be omnipresent
There are three main sources for the claims about the inevitability of cycles: (a) analytic and simulation results for the impartial culture and related distributions (e.g., Black, 1958; Gerhlein and Fishburn, 1976 a, b); (b) theorematic results apparently showing that cycles are inevitable unless highly restrictive and empirically implausible assumptions are met (Sen, 1970) ; and (c) work on generic cycling in majority rule voting in a multidimensional issue space (Mckelvey, 1976 (Mckelvey, , 1979 cf. Riker, 1982 ). Yet, cycles are so rare empirically that Tullock (1981) was moved to ask rhetorically "Why so much stability?" For example, my own empirical work, looking at well over a hundred elections (albeit mostly among a relatively limited number of candidates) essentially never finds cycles (see e.g., Grofman, 1988, 1990 Among a limited number of alternatives from some potentially infinite set embedded in a n-dimensional issue space, we can show that there is little chance of a cycle when the yolk is small (in two dimensions, the yolk is the smallest circle that intersects all median lines: Mckelvey, 1986 ; see also Feld and Grofman, 1990 ) and, empirically, the yolk has been found to be small . Cycles are even less likely to be observed if cycles among essentially indistinguishable (nearly identical) alternatives are simply disregarded (Feld and Grofman, 1996) .24 2.2. In two-party competition, political parties should converge Downs (1957) is often treated as arguing that, at least in two-party competition in a single dimension, parties will tend to converge to the location of the median voter. Yet, while there certainly is evidence for some (strong) centripetal pressures in two-party systems, parties don't really converge, and the center can even "empty out," as it arguably has in the present U.S. Congress. For example, numerous scholars have shown that, in the U.S., when a given constituency elects members of opposite parties (e.g., when a congressional seat changes hands to a member of the opposite parties, or in states which are simultaneously represented by senators of opposite parties), the difference in voting records (as judged, say, by ADA scores) between the office-holders of different parties can be huge (Fiorina, 1974 Downs' famous result about two-party convergence rests on numerous subsidiary assumptions in addition to unidimensionality and two-party competition (Grofman, 1993c) . If one or more of these assumptions is violated/replaced with more realistic assumption or more complex institutional arrangements, then the (full) convergence result almost certainly fails to go through (Grofman, 2001 ).25 We can illustrate this point with respect to the existence of multiple constituencies rather than a single election.
Consider a situation where each party can get a roughly 50% chance of winning each and every constituency if they pick identical platforms. Each party could suffer dramatic reversals in the parliament in some election if there were short term forces affecting each legislative constituency (related, say, to the personal attractiveness or policy positions of the presidential candidate of the party, or to national economic factors) that turned marginal seats into losses. For risk averse parties competing in marginal constituencies, tweedledum-tweedledee politics need no longer be optimal. In particular, if constituencies differ in the location of their median voter, and each party's candidates must take the same position as their national party, were the national party to stake out a policy position designed to make very likely wins for its candidates in some constituencies, while largely conceding a portion of the other constituencies to their opponents, parties could be assured that, no matter what happened, they would retain some hold on power.
It is also important to note that the candidates elected from each party might look different from one another even if the candidates nominated by each party present near identical positions within any given constituency. Because of association with national party images, in constituencies that are more liberal, the candidate associated with the more liberal of the two parties is likely to be advantaged, while in constituencies that are more conservative the candidate of the more conservative party is advantaged (Grofman, Koetzle, McDonald and Brunell, 2000). Thus, ceteris paribus, in the U.S., liberal constituencies and conservative constituencies are likely to elect candidates from different parties even if the candidates of each party within those constituencies try to compete for the allegiance of the median voter in the constituency -with liberal constituencies more likely to elect Democrats and conservative constituencies more likely to elect Republicans.
We should also note that there are conditions under which we may expect modal rather than median (or mean) outcomes to be chosen; i.e., we may have leaders chosen who are more extreme than their followers ( 
Potential voters shouldn't vote
The notion that rational choice models of turnout imply that (almost) no one should vote has been repeated so often that it has become a truism. Certainly, Downs (1957) offers a model in which purely instrumental calculations about the short term effects of one's vote in a single election (where the value of one's vote must be discounted by the likelihood that it will decisive in affecting the outcome of the election) lead to expectations of few or no voters, unless we also build in factors such as citizen duty or non-instrumental benefits of voting (analogous, perhaps, to why sports fans might loudly cheer their team on to victory, while watching the game on TV at home, alone). Yet, in fact, while turnout varies both across countries, and within-nation, across types of elections, and across types of voters, just about everywhere a substantial proportion of eligible voters do vote -and at least some of those eligible to vote do so with substantial regularity. What they view as a "nobody should vote" prediction gives Green and Shapiro (1994) a lot of chuckles at the expense of rational choice theorists, supposedly caught like rats in a maze (of their own devising) and unable to find a way out. Even Morris Fiorina has pondered the question of whether "turnout is the paradox that ate rational choice theory." (see Grofman, 1993b) .
My view is that we have been "seduced" by Anthony Downs to believe that voters should only vote for instrumental reasons (and then "abandoned" by him as well when he lost interest in the topics of his doctoral dissertation). People rarely act solely for instrumental motives, and it is unnecessary to posit that that they do.26 A better way to think about the Downsian model of turnout is in terms of "comparative statics," i.e., by looking at the partial derivatives of turnout with respect to variables such as election importance, and perceived impact on outcome.27 In doing so it is possible to develop non-trivial testable (and accurate) predictions related to turnout.28
Potential voters should remain largely ignorant about the nature of the electoral choices facing them, and should not seek out such information
The notion of rational ignorance is correctly attributed to Downs (1957).
However, while it is hard to overestimate voter ignorance (especially about factual matters); yet (some) voters sometimes follow political campaigns with much the same interest and intensity that others devote to, say, sports playoffs. Here, going back rereading Downs makes it clear that Downs' views about information and politics went well beyond the idea of rational ignorance. Indeed, Downs' details various ways in which voters will either come to be informed, or will be able to act "as if" they were informed in the sense of making a choice that would be appropriate if they were to know all that was to be known about the candidates/options available to them in an election. In particular, Downs introduces the role of parties as signaling devices and the by-product theory of knowledge. 
Coalitions should be minimal winning
While there is interesting (and now largely neglected) modeling of coalition processes by social psychologists even before Riker (1962) , that book makes the important claim that we ought to expect minimal winning coalitions in a number of different contexts, including multiparty cabinet coalitions. When we turn to the evidence we find that, at least for cabinets, minimal winning coalitions, while common, are not modal. For example, Only about 40% of European cabinets in the post WWII period are minimal winning -albeit this is a far higher percentage than would be expected by chance (Laver and Schofield, 1990) . Why don't we get minimal winning coalitions? Well, one simple answer is that Riker's (1962) results rests on the assumption that politics is a zero-sum game, involving purely office-seeking; once, however, we admit of ideology/policy goals, than politics is no longer zero-sum (Grofman, 1984) .29 Yet Riker (1962) has played a remarkable role in inspiring a considerable amount of important work -on models of coalition formation and dissolution and of policy and portfolio bargaining game among coalition actors -work which usually rejects both the book's main assumptions and its main conclusion.30 The work inspired by Riker (1962) 17. Moreover, both concepts need to be distinguished from the more normative concept of "political individualism" (sometimes called "possessive individualism"), i.e., the (Lockean) notion that societies ought to be based upon a social contract that provides fundamental protections for individual rights.
In addition to homo economicus, Buchanan's work on constitutional economics emphasized the contractarian tradition. However, Buchanan, would not, I think, regard himself as social contract theorist in the Lockean tradition because of the importance he, following Wicksell, places on the need for unanimous agreement. Of course, as is clear from the Calculus, Buchanan does see his ideas as linked to those of perhaps the greatest of all
American-born political scientists, James Madison. As Buchanan comments about Calculus of Consent in Better than Plowing (1992: 9): Tullock and I "more or less explicitly considered our exercise to be an implicit defense of the Madisonian structure embedded in the United States Constitution."
19. For example, some of the scholars who emphasize the explanatory power of norms, or social roles, or collectively embedded social identities, would insist that such ideas cannot be reconciled within a rational choice framework. Of course, that insistence mostly indicates an unfamiliarity with the potential scope of formal modeling. A prioristic criticisms of Public Choice models based on the "inevitable" empirical limitations of such models doesn't cut it; it's similar to debating how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.
(To have an empirically meaningful debate about such an issue you would first have to find the angels, and then you would need to specify the size of the pin.).
20. I will elaborate on this last point later in the essay.
21. Unfortunately, absurd "lines in the sand" are drawn by scholars on both sides of the rational choice -anti rational choice divide in political science. For example, some of the most technically skilled rational choice modelers suffer from the hubris of believing that if it's not a theorem it's not a contribution to political science. That point of view is just as silly as the attempts to eliminate formalization or sophisticated quantitative analyses from the discipline. As I have noted in earlier work (Grofman, 1993a) , game theory is to the social sciences what calculus is to the physical sciences, but just as not every application of calculus is a contribution to physics, not every application of game theory is a contribution to political science. For any model, for any explanation, the proof is in the pudding: does it help us make sense of the real world; is it (at least in principle) falsifiable; does it lead to (non-trivial) implications about other aspects of the world. and that eligible voters go to the polls if the expected benefits of their vote's contribution to the election of the candidate for whom they would choose to vote exceed the "costs" of voting. 27. People usually have multiple motives; for example, very few people pick their food solely on the basis of its expected impact on their longevity; yet if information came out that a given food was dangerous to one's health, at the margin, we would expect that information to matter for consumption choice. 28. I take a similar "comparative statics" perspective visa vis related issues raised by Olson and others in terms of the provision of public goods. 29. This claim is elaborated in Grofman, 1993b; Grofman, 1996; Hanks and Grofman, 1998. 30. We will, however, note that, if we treat all European post WWII democracies as if their politics were unidimensional and consider the best-fitting array of parties on that single dimension, the simple prediction that the median party will be in the governing coalition works quite well, and if it is also the largest party it's likelihood of being in the governing coalition is above 80%. See the excellent review in Laver and Schofield (1990). 31. We will not try to review that extensive literature here. 32. Many years later, at Gordon's urging, I wrote a long intellectual homage to Black, (Grofman, 1981) . 33. 1969 is also the first year I attended the annual meeting of the Public Choice Society.
Since that first article, I have published over a dozen articles and research notes in Public
Choice ( My first article, a version of that MA Thesis, was submitted to Public Choice. The first draft was still deeply flawed but, rather than rejecting the paper out of hand, knowing that I was still just a beginning graduate student, Gordon Tullock, then sole editor of the journal, strongly encouraged me to revise and resubmit. Indeed, he allowed the article to go through three rounds of revise and resubmit before running out of patience -and accepting it for appearance in Public Choice in 1969.32
Gordon has said about altruism that it's not that the concept is meaningless, it's just that there isn't very much of it around. Well, Gordon's kindness to a graduate student whom he'd never met is not something that I've ever forgotten, even though there probably is some theorem of Gary Becker that can be used to explain it away as entirely self-interested behavior: the "rotten Gordon" theorem. As a young academic I wanted to do the kind of work that would allow me to grow up to become president (of the Public Choice Society). But it wasn't clear that that would ever happen. Most presidents of the Society have been figures who reshaped their discipline. In the typology made famous by Isaiah Berlin, they are hedgehogs, not foxes.41 Or to put it another way (my way), they are waffle irons, not popcorn machines, and certainly not cuisinarts.42 While I sometimes wish I were a waffle iron,43 and I believe quite strongly that I am not a cuisinart, about one thing, I can't kid myself: "Grofman, thy name is popcorn."44 Moreover, there is something quite mysterious about the Public Choice Society's election processes for its president -which make it hard to see exactly how one is supposed to grow up to become its president. Once upon a time the Society had a "show democracy" rather like what Mexico had throughout almost all the past century. I suspect most readers are familiar with how this worked in Mexico: the President ante, El Maximo Supremo, chooses El Maximo Supremo post, and his choice was rubberstamped by the ruling party, the PRI, and then the new El Maximo Supremo is elected without "serious opposition" -as determined by the PRI loyalists who were handling the ballot counting/ballot stuffing ritual.
But the Public Choice Society has done the PRI one better. For well over a decade we have eliminated even that vestigial appearance of democracy, the Society's business meeting. The Society has obviously taken very seriously Ken Arrow's argument that any reasonable procedure for generating social choice is flawed -unless we wish to accept a dictator. Confronted with the horns of that dilemma, the potential for intransitive social choice vs. dictatorship, we have seized one -we have opted for dictatorship.
A natural question, then, is "How did I become President of the Public Choice Society?" I attribute this event to three things: location, location and location. First, I was located in the right discipline: namely political science. I am an "affirmative action baby," i.e., a beneficiary of the "rule" (sic!) that the Presidency of the Society, shall, roughly speaking, rotate between economists and political scientists -even though the latter are only a minority of the Society's membership. Second, I was located at the right age -a stage of life I think of as "past one's salad days," but still young enough to look forward to dessert. (My first article was published in 1969, more than thirty years ago -of course, my present mental image of self is of someone barely old enough to have been born in 1969.) Third, while some other political scientists involved in the early days of the Society rarely ever attend these days, wherever Public Choice Society meeting have been held over the past thirty or so years, there generally you have found me.45 Clearly, Jim and Gordon and other past presidents could see that, as far as the Society was concerned, I had, indeed, "paid my dues" -quite literally. Relatedly, if I were to become president it was very likely that I'd actually be at the next meeting. So, when Bill Niskanen, whom I'd never met, sent me a two-line e-mail asking me whether I would like to be president, I accepted.
